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Abstract
iDASH is a competition soliciting implementations of cryptographic schemes of interest in the context
of biology. In 2019, one track asked for multi-party computation implementations of training of a machine
learning model suitable for two datasets from cancer research. In this note, we describe our solution
submitted to the competition. We found that the training can be run on three AWS c5.9xlarge instances
in less then one minute using MPC tolerating one semi-honest corruption, and less than ten seconds at
a slightly lower accuracy.
1 Introduction
In this section, we summarize the task.1 Participants were invited to implement machine learning (ML)
training in multi-party computation (MPC). MPC allows a set of parties to jointly compute on data hold
among each other without revealing anything other than the result of the computation. In the current
context this means that a set of healthcare providers holding measurements about cancer patients and
healthy individuals can jointly compute a ML model detecting cancer without sharing the measurements.
The training algorithm must be suitable to the GSE2034 [14] and BC-TCGA [11] breast cancer datasets.
The organizers provided a subset of both. For GSE2034, this contains 142 positive (recurrence tumor) and
83 negative (no recurrence normal) samples, each with 12,634 features. On the other hand, the subset of
BC-TCGA contains 422 positive (breast cancer tissue) and 48 negative (normal tissue) samples of 17,814
features each. The organizers provided a reference model, and the submissions were expected to perform
similarly.
In terms of security, the competition asked for three-party computation with one semi-honest corrup-
tion. This security model has received widespread attention because it does not require relatively expensive
cryptographic primitives such as oblivious transfer or homomorphic encryption. Instead, so-called replicated
secret sharing suffices, where every party holds two out of three random shares which sum up to a secret
value [2]. Furthermore, semi-honest security requires that even corrupted parties follow the protocol, which
allows the creation of optimized protocols for specific purposes, for example probabilistic truncation [5].
For the evaluation, the organizers asked for Docker containers that would be run on three hosts in a
local cluster. The submissions were required to finish within 24 hours, and they were ranked on accuracy,
performance, and communication.
2 The Model
We evaluated the performance of the following baseline models using plaintext computation
1http://www.humangenomeprivacy.org/2019/competition-tasks.html
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Logistic Logistic regression based on mini-batch stochastic gradient descent (SGD) with constant learning
rate and momentum. The model is trained for a fixed number of 100 epochs. In each mini-batch of 16
samples, we re-balance the positive and negative classes by re-sampling the same number of samples
from these two classes;
MLP A multilayer perceptron with two hidden layers of 256+64 ReLU [7] neurons. We apply dropout [13]
with probability 0.5 to the hidden layers to avoid over-fitting. The model is trained by SGD for 100
epochs using the same mini-batches as Logistic;
Linear SVM A linear SVM classifier with L2 regularization and typical settings. We use scikit-learn’s [12]
implementation with a stopping tolerance of 10−3 and other default settings;
Random Forest A random forest classier [9] with 100 trees based on scikit-learn’s [12] implementation;
Reference The reference model provided by the iDASH committee, which is a deep 1D convolutional
network composed of Residual blocks [8]. We train the model using the Adam optimizer [10] with a
fixed learning rate of 10−4 for 30 epochs.
In these models, both Logistic and Linear SVM correspond to a single-neuron model. The main difference
between these two methods is the loss function: Logistic minimizes the cross-entropy between the target
label and the prediction, while Linear SVM minimizes the squared Hinge loss. The detailed hyper-parameter
configurations are omitted for brevity. We tried to achieve a representative accuracy score for each method.
Further tuning these methods can give marginal improvement. We tried to compare all methods using similar
settings such as how the mini-batches are constructed and how the performance is evaluated.
Denote TP (true positive), FN (false negative) to be the population of the ground truth positive class;
denote TN (true negative), and FP (false positive) to be the negative class. Then the F1 score of these two
classes are given by the harmonic mean of the precision and recall, that is,
FP1 =
2
1
TP
TP+FP
+ 1TP
TP+FN
=
2TP
2TP+ FP + FN
, FN1 =
2TN
2TN+ FP + FN
. (1)
Then we evaluate the classification performance based on the weighted F1 score
F1 =
TP+ FN
TP + TN+ FP + FN
FP1 +
TN+ FP
TP + TN+ FP + FN
FN1 , (2)
which is a population-weighted mean of FP1 and F
N
1 .
See Table 1 for our cross-validation accuracy scores and timing results. Observe that MLP does not
improve over Logistic, because the training data is linearly separable and prone to over-fitting. The poor
performance of the reference model, despite its expensive training cost, is due to over-fitting. One may
improve further its performance with a carefully designed optimization procedure, e.g., based on dynamic
learning rates. However, the benefit is quite limited in light of the high complexity to implement it.
Eventually, we decided to go ahead with logistic regression because its accuracy comes close the other
models while its simplicity promised a more efficient implementation. In the next section, we will show that
our MPC implementation slightly surpasses the plaintext implementation of logistic regression and comes
even closer to the linear SVM classifier in terms of accuracy.
3 Our Implementation
We implemented our solution in MP-SPDZ [6]. It features fixed-point computation, that is, the fractional
number x is represented as an integer near x · 2k for some k. Addition and subtraction are straight-forward
due to linearity while multiplication is implemented as integer multiplication followed by truncation. This
truncation can either mean rounding to the nearest integer or the more efficient probabilistic truncation where
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GSE2034 BC-TCGA
Model F1 Time (sec) F1 Time (sec)
Logistic 0.666± 0.062 3 0.995± 0.006 8
MLP 0.664± 0.066 35 0.994± 0.007 39
Linear SVM 0.677± 0.058 1 0.996± 0.006 0.3
Random Forest 0.592± 0.055 0.6 0.988± 0.011 0.8
Reference 0.650± 0.075 68⋆ 0.987± 0.008 139⋆
Table 1: Weighted F1 score and computational time in seconds with plaintext computation. All reported
number are averages over 20 runs of five-fold cross validation (100 folds in total). The reported time in seconds
is measured on an Intel Core i5-7300U CPU. The upper-script “⋆” means that the timing is performed instead
on a NVidia Tesla P100 because the experiments could not finish in reasonable time.
Dataset Duration Truncation F1 Time (sec)
GSE2034
100
Probabilistic 0.670± 0.070 8
Exact 0.666± 0.068 20
200
Probabilistic 0.674± 0.063 14
Exact 0.670± 0.066 38
Variable
Probabilistic 0.657± 0.091 6
Exact 0.650± 0.091 22
BC-TCGA
100
Probabilistic 0.994± 0.007 21
Exact 0.994± 0.008 43
200
Probabilistic 0.994± 0.007 38
Exact 0.994± 0.009 77
Variable
Probabilistic 0.995± 0.010 8
Exact 0.994± 0.011 17
Table 2: Five-fold cross-validation accuracy and running times of our implementation
rounding down is the more likely the closer the input number is to the floor. See Catrina and Saxena [3] for
more details.
Standard logistic regression uses the sigmoid function based on the exponential, and computing the loss
requires the logarithm function. Our implementation of these is based on the code provided in SCALE-
MAMBA [4] by Aly and Smart [1].
A particular helpful feature of MP-SPDZ in some protocols including the one used here is the implemen-
tation of dot products of fixed-point numbers with constant communication. See Dalskov et al. [5] for more
details. Due to this optimization, we decided not to use mini-batches but the whole training set at once for
simplicity. The benefit of the optimization increases with the size of the batch. Our implementation can be
straightforwardly generalized to mini-batch training.
Given the decisions above, we ran our implementation with a few parameters on AWS c5.9xlarge,
namely the precision of fixed-point truncation and the duration. For the former, there is a choice of proba-
bilistic and exact truncation. Considering the latter, we saw that it takes about 100 epochs for the loss to
get close to zero without using mini-batches. Therefore, we ran our implementation either for 100 or for 200
epochs, or until the loss was below 10−4.
Table 2 shows the five-fold cross-validation accuracy and running time for each combination of parameters
and dataset. Each values is averaged over 100 runs. Note that the running times are taken from the same
run as the accuracies and therefore use only 80% of the respective dataset.
The implementation used for these timings is different to the submitted version in two points: The
submitted version would only use a single thread because the evaluation criterion was changed from a
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single host to several shortly before the deadline. Furthermore, the improved version uses the dot product
optimization more consequently. We have seen that this reduces the running time by about one third.
Given the result, one would choose 200 epochs with probabilistic rounding for the best accuracy and
variable duration with probabilistic rounding for faster inference at the cost of accuracy. However, we did
not have time to run these evaluations before the deadline. From the limited information we had at the time,
we decided to submit the training with 200 epochs and exact rounding. We achieved slightly better accuracy
than logistic regression with plaintext computation, because a limited precision helps improve generalization
on these two datasets.
References
[1] A. Aly and N. P. Smart. Benchmarking privacy preserving scientific operations. In R. H. Deng,
V. Gauthier-Uman˜a, M. Ochoa, and M. Yung, editors, ACNS 19, volume 11464 of LNCS, pages 509–529.
Springer, Heidelberg, June 2019.
[2] T. Araki, J. Furukawa, Y. Lindell, A. Nof, and K. Ohara. High-throughput semi-honest secure three-
party computation with an honest majority. In E. R. Weippl, S. Katzenbeisser, C. Kruegel, A. C. Myers,
and S. Halevi, editors, ACM CCS 2016, pages 805–817. ACM Press, Oct. 2016.
[3] O. Catrina and A. Saxena. Secure computation with fixed-point numbers. In R. Sion, editor, FC 2010,
volume 6052 of LNCS, pages 35–50. Springer, Heidelberg, Jan. 2010.
[4] COSIC, KU Leuven. SCALE-MAMBA. https://github.com/KULeuven-COSIC/SCALE-MAMBA, 2019.
[5] A. Dalskov, D. Escudero, and M. Keller. Secure evaluation of quantized neural networks. Cryptology
ePrint Archive, Report 2019/131, 2019. https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/131.
[6] Data61. MP-SPDZ. https://github.com/data61/MP-SPDZ, 2019.
[7] X. Glorot, A. Bordes, and Y. Bengio. Deep sparse rectifier neural networks. In Proceedings of the
Fourteenth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics, volume 15 of Proceedings
of Machine Learning Research, pages 315–323. PMLR, 2011.
[8] K. He, X. Zhang, S. Ren, and J. Sun. Deep residual learning for image recognition. In CVPR, pages
770–778, 2016.
[9] T. K. Ho. Random decision forests. In International Conference on Document Analysis and Recognition,
pages 278–282, 1995.
[10] D. P. Kingma and J. Ba. Adam: A method for stochastic optimization. In ICLR, 2015.
https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6980.
[11] C. G. A. Network et al. Comprehensive molecular portraits of human breast tumours. Nature,
490(7418):61, 2012.
[12] F. Pedregosa, G. Varoquaux, A. Gramfort, V. Michel, B. Thirion, O. Grisel, M. Blondel, P. Prettenhofer,
R. Weiss, V. Dubourg, J. Vanderplas, A. Passos, D. Cournapeau, M. Brucher, M. Perrot, and E. Duch-
esnay. Scikit-learn: Machine learning in Python. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 12:2825–2830,
2011.
[13] N. Srivastava, G. Hinton, A. Krizhevsky, I. Sutskever, and R. Salakhutdinov. Dropout: A simple way to
prevent neural networks from overfitting. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 15:1929–1958, 2014.
[14] Y. Wang, J. G. Klijn, Y. Zhang, A. M. Sieuwerts, M. P. Look, F. Yang, D. Talantov, M. Timmermans,
M. E. Meijer-van Gelder, J. Yu, et al. Gene-expression profiles to predict distant metastasis of lymph-
node-negative primary breast cancer. The Lancet, 365(9460):671–679, 2005.
4
